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Faith-Based Charter Schools: An Idea Whose 
Time Is Unlikely to Come1*
Charles J. Russo
 University of Dayton, Ohio
Gerald M. Cattaro
 Fordham University, New York
Simply stated, the efforts of their supporters notwithstanding,1 it is unlikely that faith-based charter schools,2 which are opening as the number of religiously affi liated nonpublic schools declines,3 can sur-
vive judicial scrutiny. Moreover, even if religious charter schools, whether 
Catholic,4 Christian,5 Jewish,6 or Muslim,7 can withstand challenges in fed-
eral courts,8 it is likely that they would be struck down in state courts due to 
signifi cant state constitutional restrictions9 forbidding aid to religious institu-
tions. Further, overlapping statutory limits typically prevent religious entities 
from operating charter schools,10 require that they be nonsectarian in nature,11 
and/or restrict them to operating in nonsectarian manners.12
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the charter school move-
ment, which began in 1991 in Minnesota,13 has spread to 40 states plus the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.14 Charter schools, which are public 
schools of choice, are typically operated as not-for-profi t organizations, es-
sentially functioning as independent districts consisting of single schools, by 
private groups including parents either independently or occasionally in con-
junction with public institutions such as universities.
In return for being exempted from many state regulations, charter schools 
are accountable for the academic achievement of their students. While char-
ters vary in duration, they typically range from 3 to 5 years in length.15 When 
contracts expire, depending on state law, charters can be renewed or terminat-
ed. Charter schools, although free from many state rules with regard to staff 
and curricular issues, remain subject to federal and state antidiscrimination 
laws such as those dealing with students with disabilities and employment. In 
addition, charter schools typically cannot be operated by religious groups.16 
* From “Faith-Based Charter Schools: An Idea Whose Time Is Unlikely to Come,” by C. J. Russo and 
G. M. Cattaro, 2009, Religion and Education, 36(1), pp. 72-93. Copyright 2009 by the University of 
Northern Iowa. Reprinted with permission.
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Of course, signifi cant questions remain over the extent to which faculty and 
staff in faith-based charter schools may actually teach about the religious be-
liefs and practices of their sponsors.
In light of the legal and educational issues surrounding the status of re-
ligious charter schools, this article is divided into two parts. The fi rst section 
reviews key litigation addressing the parameters of public aid to religiously 
affi liated nonpublic schools because these cases provide the necessary back-
ground should judicial challenges arise to faith-based charter schools.17 This 
fi rst part of the paper also briefl y reviews Supreme Court cases that forbid 
prayer and/or religious activities in school, an essential part of daily activities 
in religiously affi liated nonpublic schools that cannot continue in faith-based 
charter schools. The second part reviews educational and policy consider-
ations dealing with how publicly funded fi nancial assistance might impact the 
religious missions and identities of religiously affi liated nonpublic schools 
that seek to become faith-based charter schools; this section also reviews the 
constitutionality of both state aid to religious charter schools and the accept-
ability, if any, of prayer and religious activities in these schools. The article 
rounds out with a brief conclusion.
Establishment Clause Litigation
Background
The extent to which jurisdictions can provide assistance to religious schools 
depends on judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Added to the Constitution in 
1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, according to the 16 words of the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” While the 
First Amendment only forbids Congress from making laws establishing reli-
gion, in 1940 the Supreme Court extended its reach to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut.18 Consequently, litigation 
over state aid continues to be fi led in both federal and state courts.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court created confusion over the appropriate 
judicial standard when addressing state aid to religiously affi liated nonpublic 
schools and their students. As discussed below, the Court evaluates the con-
stitutionality of such aid under the tripartite Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon),19 
wherein it invalidated government aid in the form of salary supplements to 
teachers. The Court has since modifi ed the Lemon test in Agostini v. Felton20 
in which it allowed the on-site delivery of educational services for poor stu-
dents in religiously affi liated nonpublic schools. The Lemon-Agostini test 
continues to engender controversy and lack of clarity because, as discussed 
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below, it is an amalgam of two judicial standards, one dealing with prayer and 
religious activity in schools, the other on tax exemptions for religious institu-
tions used for worship. Even so, in applying Lemon-Agostini, the Court fails 
to distinguish how it can be applied in such divergent situations as a kind of 
“one-size-fi ts-all” standard in disputes over religion and education.
The Supreme Court accepted its fi rst case on the merits on an Establishment 
Clause case involving religion and public education in Everson v. Board of 
Education (Everson).21 In Everson the Court upheld a law from New Jersey 
that allowed parents to be reimbursed for the cost of transporting their chil-
dren to religiously affi liated nonpublic schools. Since Everson, two camps 
evolved in the judiciary on the question of aid: separationists and accom-
modationists. The former support the Jeffersonian metaphor calling for the 
erection of a “wall of separation” between church and state,22 language that 
does not appear in the Constitution; this is the perspective most often associ-
ated with the Supreme Court. Conversely, accommodationists reason that the 
government is not prohibited from permitting some aid or accommodating 
the needs of children under the so-called “Child Benefi t Test” or from ac-
commodating the religious preferences of parents who send their children to 
public schools.
It is worth noting that the federal Constitution is more open to some forms 
of aid to religious schools than its state counterparts. This distinction began to 
emerge on December 7, 1875, when President Ulysses S. Grant, in his fi nal 
State of the Union address to Congress, called for a constitutional amendment 
forbidding the teaching [of religion in public schools]...and prohibiting the 
granting of any school funds, or school taxes or any part thereof, either by leg-
islative, municipal, or other authority, for the benefi t or in aid, directly or indi-
rectly, of any religious sect or denomination.23
Following Grant’s speech, Senator James K. Blaine of Maine unsuccessfully 
introduced a constitutional amendment in 1875 that would have prevented 
aid from going to schools “under the control of any religious sect,”24 code 
for Roman Catholic schools. Even though Blaine’s efforts failed, most juris-
dictions adopted Blaine-type constitutional provisions that place substantial 
limits on the amounts and types of aid that state governments can provide to 
religious institutions, especially schools.25 
Nineteenth-century concerns over the relationship between religion and 
education aside, the Supreme Court did not, as indicated below, address its 
fi rst cases in this area until Everson in 1947. Over the ensuing years, the 
Court’s modern Establishment Clause perspective on the constitutionality of 
512        Catholic Education / June 2010
aid to religiously affi liated nonpublic schools evolved through three phases, 
each of which is described below.  Insofar as the cases discussed in these 
sections are likely to be applied in litigation challenging the constitutional-
ity of religious charter schools, the remainder of this section highlights key 
Supreme Court cases relevant to the parameters of permissible public aid to 
religious schools. 
The Child Benefi t Test
Phase one. During the fi rst phase, which began in 1947 with Everson 
and ended in 1968 with Board of Education of Central School District No. 
1 v. Allen,26  the Supreme Court enunciated the Child Benefi t Test. This test 
emerged as a legal construct that allows aid on the ground that doing so helps 
students rather than their religiously affi liated nonpublic schools. 
Everson upheld a statute from New Jersey that permitted the local board 
to reimburse parents for the costs associated with sending their children to 
religiously affi liated nonpublic schools.27 Without actually using the words 
“Child Benefi t Test,” a divided Supreme Court reasoned that it was permissi-
ble to extend a general benefi t such as transportation to all children (and their 
parents) without regard to their religious beliefs. However, in language por-
tending future developments, in which it would take a hard line against most 
forms of aid, Justice Black’s majority opinion introduced the Jeffersonian 
metaphor, declaring that “the First Amendment has erected a wall between 
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not 
approve the slightest breach.”28 
After Everson, lower courts reached mixed results over the constitution-
ality of publicly funded transportation to students who attend religiously 
affi liated nonpublic schools. Some cases forbade transportation to these stu-
dents in determining that doing so violated state  constitutions.29  Other courts 
reached the opposite result in essentially relying on Child Benefi t type analy-
sis.30 In its only other case dealing with transportation and religious schools, 
Wolman v. Walter (Wolman),31 the Supreme Court struck down a statute from 
Ohio that permitted public funds to be used to provide buses for fi eld trips 
for children who attended religiously affi liated nonpublic schools. In treating 
fi eld trips as curriculum-related activities, the Justices largely viewed them as 
impermissible instruction rather than as nonideological secular services such 
as transportation.
In 1968, in Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen 
(Allen),32 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a law from New 
York that required local school boards to loan textbooks for instruction in 
secular subjects to children in grades 7 to 12 who attended nonpublic schools. 
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While the statute did not specify that the books had to be the same as those 
used in the public schools, it did require local public school board offi cials to 
approve their use before they could be adopted. Basing its judgment primarily 
on the Child Benefi t Test, the Court ruled that the statute was constitutional 
because its purpose was neither to aid religion nor nonpublic schools and that 
its primary effect was to improve the quality of education for all children. 
Until the Supreme Court allowed the delivery of services to individual 
students as in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,33 Allen was the 
outer limit of the Child Benefi t Test for large groups of children prior to 
its opinion in Agostini v. Felton;34 both of these cases are discussed below. 
Further, the Court sustained the constitutionality of similar textbook provi-
sions from Pennsylvania in Meek v. Pittenger (Meek)35 and Ohio in Wolman36 
but struck down loans of instructional materials such as library books, com-
puters, television sets, tape recorders, and maps to nonpublic schools.  In 
these cases the Court also allowed local school boards to provide diagnostic 
services for auxiliary aid programs such as special education for students in 
their religiously affi liated nonpublic schools but contended that the programs 
had to be delivered off-site in public schools or neutral locations.
Phase two. Following their success in Everson and Allen, proponents of 
the Child Benefi t Test pushed the proverbial legal envelope by advancing 
statutes in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, respectively, dealing with a dif-
ferent form of aid. Both statutes provided assistance to religiously affi liated 
nonpublic schools in the guise of salary supplements for teachers in nonpub-
lic schools, an issue that would certainly emerge in disputes involving reli-
gious charter schools. In a case that has come to represent the standard test 
in Establishment Clause cases, whether aid or prayer and religious activities 
in schools,37 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 38 the Court invalidated both laws, ushering 
in an era of strict adherence to the Jeffersonian wall of separation of church 
and state.
In creating the tripartite measure destined to become known as the Lemon 
test, the Supreme Court combined the two-part test it crafted in the companion 
cases of Abington v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett 39 in striking down prayer 
and Bible reading in public schools with a third element, addressing exces-
sive entanglement, from Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City,40 which 
upheld New York State’s practice of providing state property tax exemptions 
for church property that is used in worship services. The Court wrote that:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative cri-
teria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned 
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from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, 
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion; fi nally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement 
with religion.”41
As to entanglement the Court specifi ed that “we must examine the character 
and purposes of the institutions that are benefi tted, the nature of the aid that 
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and 
religious authority.”42
In Lemon the Justices distinguished impermissible aid for teachers’ sala-
ries from acceptable secular, neutral services such as textbooks or transporta-
tion that it had upheld in Everson and Allen, fearing the necessary oversight 
to ensure that teachers avoid nonideological perspectives in their classes. 
Interestingly, as exemplifi ed by the fi nal case during the second phase in the 
history of the Child Benefi t Test, Aguilar v. Felton (Aguilar),43 most statutes 
passed Lemon’s fi rst two prongs, but ran afoul of the excessive entanglement 
test, highlighting the fact that programs must pass all three of the indepen-
dent prongs or be doomed. In Aguilar, a judgment reminiscent of Meek and 
Wolman, the Court struck down on-site delivery of Title I services designed to 
provide remedial instruction for poor children who attended religious schools 
in New York City based solely on the fear of entanglement absent any allega-
tions of inappropriate conduct.44 
The years between Lemon and Aguilar, then, represented the nadir of the 
Child Benefi t Test from the perspective of proponents of the Child Benefi t 
Test, as the Supreme Court refused to move beyond the limits it created in 
Everson and Allen. However, change was in the offi ng in the K-12 context in 
light of the Court’s ruling in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.
Phase three. In upholding the constitutionality of a program of general 
vocational assistance to a blind man who was studying to become a clergy-
man at a religious college in Witters v. Washington Department of Services 
for the Blind,45 the Supreme Court signaled that change had arrived in its 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Seven years later, in Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills School District (Zobrest),46 the Justices began the reinvigoration of 
the Child Benefi t Test, allowing it to enter a phase that extends through the 
present day. In Zobrest, the Court permitted the on-site delivery of a sign-
language interpreter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA)47 for a deaf student in Arizona who sought to attend a Catholic high 
school. The Court decided that insofar as the interpreter provided neutral aid 
to the student without offering fi nancial benefi ts to his parent or school and 
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there was no governmental participation in the instruction since the inter-
preter was only a conduit to effectuate the child’s communications, he was 
entitled to the aid. 
A year after Zobrest, though, the Supreme Court affi rmed the unconstitu-
tionality of a law from New York that created a school district that was con-
tiguous with the boundaries of the village inhabited by members of a religious 
community. The law was designed to accommodate the needs of parents of 
children with disabilities so that their young would not have to be transported 
outside of their community to received educational services under the IDEA. 
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet (Kiryas 
Joel),48 the Court struck the law down on the grounds that the school board 
could have offered appropriate special education programs at one of its public 
schools or at a neutral site near one of the village’s religious schools due to 
risk of too close of an association between religion and the state.49
The most signifi cant post-Lemon change in the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisdiction occurred in 1997 in Agostini v. Felton 
(Agostini).50 The Justices dissolved the injunction that they upheld in Aguilar, 
thereby permitting the on-site delivery of Title I services in religiously af-
fi liated nonpublic schools in New York City. The Court held that the on-site 
delivery did not violate the standards that it used to consider whether state 
aid advanced religion since there was no governmental indoctrination, there 
were no distinctions between recipients based on religion, and there was no 
excessive entanglement between religion and government. Also repudiating 
Meek and Wolman, the Court explained that a federal program that provides 
supplemental, remedial instruction and counseling services to disadvantaged 
children on a neutral basis is not unconstitutional when the assistance is pro-
vided on-site in religiously affi liated nonpublic schools pursuant to a pro-
gram containing safeguards such as those that the New York City Board of 
Education had created. The most signifi cant jurisprudential development in 
Agostini was that the Court modifi ed the Lemon test by reviewing only its fi rst 
two parts, purpose and effect, while recasting entanglement as one element in 
evaluating the statute’s effect. 
Three years later, in Mitchell v. Helms,51 a case from Louisiana, the 
Supreme Court expanded the limits of permissible aid to religiously affi liated 
nonpublic schools. A plurality, meaning that less than a fi ve Justice major-
ity agreed on the rationale, expressly repudiating those parts of Meek and 
Wolman to the contrary, upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that 
permits the loans of instructional materials including library books, comput-
ers, television sets, tape recorders, and maps to nonpublic schools. In rely-
ing largely on the hybrid Agostini test, the Court pointed out that since the 
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statute’s purpose was not in dispute, it only had to consider the law’s effect. 
The Court thus found that the statute did not foster impermissible indoctrina-
tion because aid was allocated pursuant to neutral secular criteria that neither 
favored nor disfavored religion and was available to all schools based on 
secular, nondiscriminatory grounds.
The fi nal Supreme Court case with direct relevance to the question of 
aid to religious charter schools is Zelman v. Simmons–Harris (Zelman).52 In 
Zelman, the Court upheld a voucher program from Ohio that was part of a 
larger plan for helping poor students in Cleveland’s failing public schools 
that had been taken over by the state as part of a desegregation remedy. Again 
relying on Agostini, the Court addressed “whether the government acted with 
the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religions [and] whether the aid has the 
‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.”53 
Recognizing that the voucher program in Zelman had a valid secular pur-
pose in providing aid for poor children, the Supreme Court examined whether 
it had the impermissible effect of advancing religion. The Justices observed 
that the voucher program was constitutional because, as part of the state’s 
far-reaching attempt to provide greater educational opportunities for students 
in a failing school system, it allocated aid pursuant to neutral secular criteria 
that neither favored nor disfavored religion, was available to both religious 
and secular recipients on nondiscriminatory grounds, and offered assistance 
directly to a broad class of citizens who directed the aid to religious schools 
based entirely on their own genuine and independent private choices. In par-
ticular, the Court remarked that the law was constitutional insofar as it in-
cluded safeguards so that tuition checks were sent to parents who them signed 
them over to schools such that there was no direct exchange of funds between 
religious schools and the state.
In Zelman, the Justices were unconcerned over that fact that most par-
ents sent their children to religiously affi liated nonpublic schools because 
surrounding public school districts refused to participate in the program. As 
such, the Supreme Court acknowledged that since parents sent their children 
to the religiously affi liated nonpublic schools not as a matter of law but since 
they were unwelcomed in the public schools, the program passed constitu-
tional muster. The Court concluded that since it was following an unbroken 
line of its own precedent supporting private choice that provided benefi ts di-
rectly to needy private individuals, the voucher program was constitutional.
Not surprisingly, post-Zelman suits challenging vouchers focused on 
state constitutional grounds since they are typically more stringent than 
under their federal counterpart.54 In perhaps the most notable example, the 
Supreme Court of Florida invalidated a voucher program for students who 
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attended religious schools in interpreting the law authorizing it as violat-
ing the state constitution’s requirement of a uniform system of free public 
schools.55 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit affi rmed that under a voucher pro-
gram in Florida that was available to students who attended failing schools, 
the state had no duty to pay for children to attend nonpublic schools.56 Further, 
Maine’s highest court upheld a statute that prohibited using either state57 or 
municipal58 money to pay tuition for children who attended religiously affi li-
ated nonpublic schools. 
Most recently, the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal in a challenge 
to AmeriCorps, the nationwide community service program. The Circuit 
Court for the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of AmeriCorps, 
which had similarities to the Title I program in Agostini, even though some 
participants taught religion and secular subjects in religious schools since it 
was a government program that was neutral toward religion.59 The Circuit 
Court was also satisfi ed that Americorps was constitutional because it offered 
aid directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, directed government aid 
to religious schools entirely on their own genuine and independent private 
choices. In its analysis, the court posited that no objective observer who was 
familiar with Americorps’ history would have thought that the aid to religious 
institutions had governmental endorsement or approval.
School-Sponsored Prayer and Religious Activity 
While the Supreme Court’s perspective concerning aid to students and their 
religiously affi liated nonpublic schools has passed through three distinct stag-
es, its attitude toward school-sponsored prayer and religious activity in public 
education has remained constant. Beginning with Engel v. Vitale (Engel)60 the 
Justices have basically followed an unbroken line of cases prohibiting school-
sponsored prayer and religious activity in public schools.  
Engel, the Supreme Court’s fi rst case on point, involved a prayer com-
posed by the New York State Board of Regents for suggested use in public 
schools to inculcate moral and spiritual values in students. The prayer read: 
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg 
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country.”61 In re-
sponse to a challenge to a local school board’s having adopted the prayer as 
part of a policy requiring its daily recitation in class, the Court struck it down 
as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court ruled that even absent 
overt pressure, placing the power, privilege, and support of the government 
qua school board behind a particular religious belief ran the risk of impos-
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ing indirect coercion on others, especially those who may have disagreed, to 
conform to the offi cially approved religion.
The following year, in the companion cases of Abington v. Schempp 
and Murray v. Curlett (Abington),62 the Supreme Court struck down prayer, 
in the form of the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer or Our Father, depending 
on one’s Christian denomination, and reading of Bible verses without com-
mentary in cases from Pennsylvania and Maryland, respectively. In invali-
dating the practices, the Court crafted the fi rst two prongs of the Lemon test 
discussed earlier: 
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of 
the [legislative] enactment?...[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment 
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that nei-
ther advances nor inhibits religion.63 
Aware of the backlash that its judgment may have created, the Court hastened 
to add that its judgment did not prohibit the secular study of the Bible (or re-
ligion) in public schools in appropriate context such as literature or history.64 
Subsequently, the Court invalidated displays of the 10 Commandments in 
schools even though the material was paid for with private funds65 as well as 
prayer at graduation66 and high school football games.67 
Discussion
Educational and Policy Considerations
Faith-based charter schools are seeking to step in to fi ll the void left by the 
closing of 1,200 religiously affi liated nonpublic schools between the years 
2000 and 2006.68 Leaders in religiously affi liated nonpublic school systems 
must grapple with increasing social secularism, population and demographic 
shifts, such as the growth of the percentages of students in Catholic schools, 
for example, who are not Catholic,69 rising costs, and fi nancial distress in 
light of the current economic conditions. These challenges present leaders 
in religiously affi liated nonpublic schools with the greatest challenge in their 
history as they attempt to offer affordable quality educational alternatives for 
families while staying faithful to their religious-educational missions. In fact, 
many historically culturally rich religious organizations face uphill battles 
against long odds in many places for survival, a situation that educational 
leaders in earlier generations neither experienced nor anticipated. 
The existential crisis confronting leaders in religiously affi liated nonpub-
lic schools has generated a situation of organizational ecology that can be 
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characterized as a Darwinist perspective requiring institutions to seek on-
going viability in an environment where “survival of the fi ttest” rules the 
day.70  The advent of the charter school movement, while far from serving as 
a cure-all for the ailments that affl ict religiously affi liated nonpublic schools, 
may have provided the worthwhile impetus compelling leaders in faith-based 
schools to confront their dire straits concerning the organizational mortality 
of their systems and the potential demise of individual schools. 
Underpinning the charter school movement is that they provide educa-
tional choice, less bureaucracy, and a reduced amount of public fi nancial 
contributions, apparently making for a perfect fi t since such schools are seem-
ingly modeled after the religious schools that they are largely replacing. In 
light of the organizational characteristics that charter schools generally share 
with religiously affi liated nonpublic schools, it may be easy to see why some 
faith-based educational leaders misguidedly viewed the exterior infrastruc-
tures of charter schools as providing quick fi xes to their dilemmas in pur-
suit of the preservation of quality (religious) education. While many leaders 
in faith-based schools accept the notion of religious charter schools in good 
faith, they are deceived by a systemic isomorphic, or similar, organizational 
structure that mimics the success that religious schools have long enjoyed.71
More to the point, organizers of charter schools seek to fl atten organiza-
tional structures in applying the principle of solidarity by bringing educational 
decision-making to the local level in the hope of improving student achieve-
ment because they share many of the same characteristics of religiously af-
fi liated nonpublic schools. Among the qualities that charter and traditional 
religiously affi liated nonpublic schools have in common are that they tend 
to be mission driven, focus on academic achievement, operate as schools of 
choice, engage parents in the education of their children, provide a family-
like learning atmosphere, build and anchor communities, promote a spirit 
of innovation, foster teacher professionalism, and offer new models of ac-
countability.72 Yet, what may be missing in charter schools are the intangible 
elements such as the faith dimensions or the beliefs of members of school 
communities that have helped faith-based schools succeed. Put another way, 
it is unclear how it is possible to have faith-based schools without allowing 
educators to teach explicitly about the faith and praxis that served as the en-
gine that drove religiously affi liated nonpublic schools for generations. 
In this mix, since most recognize the great good that religious schools 
have long provided,73 not the least of which is saving public funds,74 propo-
nents of faith-based charter schools wish to establish schools as many reli-
giously affi liated nonpublic schools cease operations. Of course, signifi cant 
legal issues will arise when charter school organizers attempt to fi nd ways 
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to circumvent constitutional and statutory provisions75 expressly prohibiting 
them from implementing some of the very same characteristics that helped 
provide success in faith-based schools such as their religiosity and shared 
faith communities in attempting to open religious charter schools. 
The initial openness of religious leaders, particularly in the Catholic 
school systems in Washington, D.C. and New York City,76 to convert some of 
their schools into faith-based charter schools may well have been propelled 
by the superfi cial similarities between the two systems and the positive assis-
tance that both can continue to offer in local communities, especially in inner 
cities. Along with these attributes, other external structures in the organiza-
tion of public charter schools such as adaptability and fl exibility fi nd a great 
fi t in the religious school culture while likewise adding to their isomorphic 
natures. In this regard, an argument may be made that charter schools are fl ex-
ible enough to offer religious objectives in educational programming.77 
On closer examination, though, it appears that the external organizational 
features of proposed faith-based charter schools only mimic the organiza-
tional domains of religiously affi liated nonpublic schools. Such a situation 
creates an ephemeral, even unreachable or unattainable, goal for those who 
wish to serve underrepresented populations in faith-based institutions since 
they would have to be transformed to what might be described as “religious 
schools-lite,” schools constructed around religious themes broadly but which, 
based on the current state of the law, cannot include teachings of particular 
faiths as long as they receive public funds. Moreover, as legal controversies 
emerge, confl icts will arise in such key areas as governance and curricular 
content, incident to confl ict over the notion of “control follows the dollar,” 
topics that are discussed in the next section.
Legal Issues
As the number of religiously affi liated nonpublic schools declines, support-
ers of faith-based charter schools will undoubtedly step up their efforts to cir-
cumvent existing judicial precedent, statutes, and/or constitutional provisions 
restricting their ability to operate such schools. Yet, regardless of whether 
challengers apply the Lemon test or its hybrid Agostini version, the preceding 
review of litigation should demonstrate the likely insurmountable diffi culty 
that supporters of faith-based charter schools will face in attempting to fend 
off Establishment Clause scrutiny. 
The likelihood that laws creating religious charter schools will be struck 
down is very real because it is virtually impossible to argue that they can sat-
isfy the requirements of having secular legislative purposes while avoiding 
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the advancing of religion, and/or sidestep concerns with excessive entangle-
ment of religion and government, not only due to questions of aid but also 
on account of issues dealing with religious content in school curricula and 
other activities. Further, to the extent that faith-based charter schools would 
be seeking public funds, their religious practices would come under intense 
scrutiny insofar as the application of “control follows the dollar” would re-
quire closer oversight by governmental bodies, thereby exacerbating the con-
stitutional diffi culties, especially with regard to entanglement. 
As individuals and/or groups seek to operate religious charter schools, 
they are likely to face a myriad of legal issues dealing with such signifi cant 
issues as governance, parental choice, and the place of prayer and religious 
activity in schools and their curricula. As to the fundamental question of gov-
ernance, to the extent that Catholic schools, for instance, are typically part of 
larger parish legal corporations, it is unclear how transfers of title would be 
viewed legally, especially if religious leaders were involved in establishing of 
governing boards. That is, since governance corresponds to the set of policies 
and customs by which organizations are controlled, thus ensuring represen-
tation by stakeholders, it is unclear what role the government would have in 
arrangements of this nature. 
At the same time, when applied to faith-based charter schools, the no-
tion of governance suggests that some other “body” is in control, such as an 
independent governing board, that may not share the beliefs of parents who 
wish to send their children to these schools. Consequently, while faith-based 
charter schools may offer opportunities for streamlined models of educa-
tional delivery and site-based control similar to what occurs in religiously 
affi liated nonpublic schools,78 they must rely on outside bodies, or boards, of 
control. Even though religious institutions, acting as sponsors, may provide 
buildings and agencies for charter schools, they are unlikely to be exempt 
from the control issues related to not-for-profi t boards, state statutes, and 
federal guidelines. 
Faith-based charter schools are also likely to be confronted by a series of 
diffi cult questions with the potential to impact signifi cantly their missions and 
identities, especially if they had formerly operated as religiously affi liated 
nonpublic schools. For example, how many parents of students in faith-based 
charter schools will not be parishioners or even members of their faith com-
munities? Will school offi cials be required to report students who are undocu-
mented aliens? If faculty members are to serve as role models, who will defi ne 
what it means to do so, particularly in the context of Title VII and exceptions 
that allow religious employers to hire members of their own faiths?79 Whose 
health curriculum, relating to such matters as birth control and abortion, will 
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have to be taught? Will administrators and teachers be viewed as ministers of 
the faith or agents of the state?
Additional questions are likely to emerge pursuant to the notion that par-
ents opted to send their children to religious charter schools based on their own 
independent private choices. The notion of parental choice that the Supreme 
Court accepted in Zelman notwithstanding, challengers will raise questions 
over the extent to which such independent decision-making measures up with 
the requisite safeguards that need to be in place to avoid entanglement be-
tween religion and government, regardless of whether one applies the origi-
nal Lemon or its modifi cation in Agostini. Further, as refl ected in Kiryas Joel, 
even when public offi cials try to accommodate sincerely held parental reli-
gious beliefs for the benefi t of their children, Establishment Clause issues 
can come to the fore that would invalidate what may appear to be reasonable 
requests designed for the best educational interest of students. 
Other signifi cant challenges to religious charter schools will surface in 
connection with interrelated concerns dealing with prayer and religious activ-
ity, religious artifacts/iconography80 in schools, and curricular content con-
trol. Serious concerns arise here under the purpose, effect, and entanglement 
prongs of Lemon-Agostini, especially in light of potential allegations that ed-
ucators have advanced religion, a claim that has already surfaced in connec-
tion with the instructional program at a Muslim charter school in Minnesota,81 
a claim that its supporters dispute.82  
Complying with case law will undoubtedly require educational leaders 
to prevent prayer and religious activity from taking place in faith-based char-
ter schools, the posting of religious artifacts/iconography in schools,83 and 
instruction about religion from curricula, changes that would fundamentally 
modify their nature and missions. In this light, it is mystifying why Catholic 
religious leaders in the District of Columbia and New York City84 would have 
chosen to embark on such an approach.85 While it may be admirable that 
these leaders tried to ensure the survival of the diversity that religious schools 
provide in the educational marketplace of ideas, at what cost are they doing 
so? Are they essentially “robbing Peter to pay Paul” in creating faith-based 
charter schools that could probably not teach about religion? In other words, 
to the extent that religiously affi liated nonpublic schools, especially at the el-
ementary school level, are dedicated to the inculcation of the beliefs of their 
faiths, it remains to be seem how such schools can survive judicial challenges 
if they teach about religion. 
As to the issue of religion in curricula, it is mystifying why religious lead-
ers would seek to move to a faith-based charter school model since they will 
have lost substantial, if not total, control over school operations. A related 
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question is whether courts would treat transfers in ownership in title over 
buildings as sham transactions that are essentially designed to accomplish 
educational/curricular goals that they had hitherto been prohibited from pur-
suing. Further, even if one places the issue of ownership and control aside, 
insofar as charter schools are public schools, albeit ones that are free from 
many state requirements, and it is well settled that they can teach about reli-
gion but cannot teach religion per se,86 disputes are likely to emerge over how 
pervasive religion is in school curricula.
The upshot is that to the extent that faith-based charter schools seek to 
teach about religion in a manner similar to what transpires in religiously af-
fi liated nonpublic schools, then, consistent with precedent, they will be pro-
hibited from doing so. Beyond that, even if faith-based charter schools are 
able to teach about religion, it opens the door to the specter of having civil 
educational offi cials decide what can and cannot be taught in religion classes, 
thereby running the risk of casting a new “pall of orthodoxy”87 on the free ex-
ercise of religion in educational settings. This is a situation that even the most 
ardent proponents of faith-based charter schools would not welcome.
Conclusion
As noted at the outset, despite the well-intentioned efforts of their supporters, 
the combination of constitutional and statutory prohibitions, in conjunction 
with long-standing judicial precedent, make it clear that organizers of faith-
based charter schools are unlikely to have much success. Thus, proponents 
of faith-based charter schools may have to go back to the proverbial drawing 
board in attempting to devise means of serving children whose parents would 
like them educated in religious environments.
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